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1. Introduction 
In this chapter we will describe a legal framework for Next Generation Robots (NGRs) that 
has safety as its central focus. The framework is offered in response to the current lack of 
clarity regarding robot safety guidelines, despite the development and impending release of 
tens of thousands of robots into workplaces and homes around the world. We also describe 
our proposal for a safety intelligence (SI) concept that addresses issues associated with open 
texture risk for robots that will have a relatively high level of autonomy in their interactions 
with humans. Whereas Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics are frequently held up as a 
suitable foundation for creating an artificial moral agency for ensuring robot safety, here we 
will explain our skepticism that a model based on those laws is sufficient for that purpose. 
In its place we will recommend an alternative legal machine language (LML) model that uses 
non-verbal information from robot sensors and actuators to protect both humans and 
robots. To implement a LML model, robotists must design a biomorphic nerve reflex 
system, and legal scholars must define safety content for robots that have limited “self-
awareness.”  
2. Service robots 
Since the Japanese already show signs of a special obsession with robots, it is no surprise 
that many new ideas on robot regulation are also emerging from Japan. Regarded as a 
“robot kingdom,” it will most likely be the first country to produce and sell large numbers 
of NGRs for private use (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry [METI], 2004). That day 
is expected to emerge within the next two decades, raising both expectations and concerns 
among safety-conscious Japanese (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan [COGJ], 2007). 
Issued in February 2004, the Fukuoka World Robot Declaration contains details on Japanese 
expectations for emerging NGRs that will co-exist with and assist human beings, physically 
and psychologically. The guiding principle behind the document is to contribute to the 
realization of a safe and peaceful society (European Robotics Research Network [EURON], 
2006); however, it fails to describe what NGRs should be. 
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In a report predicting the near future (2020-2025) in robot development, the Japanese Robot 
Policy Committee (RPC, established by METI) discusses two NGR categories: (a) next 
generation industrial robots capable of manufacturing a wide range of products in variable 
batch sizes, performing multiple tasks, and (unlike their general industrial predecessors) 
working with or near human employees; and (b) service robots capable of performing such 
tasks as house cleaning, security, nursing, life support, and entertainment—all functions 
that will be performed in co-existence with humans in businesses and homes (METI, 2004). 
The report authors predict that humans will gradually give NGRs a growing number of 
repetitive and dangerous service tasks, resulting in increased potential for unpredictable 
and dangerous actions. In a separate report published the following year, the RPC 
distinguished between the two NGR categories by listing three unique characteristics of 
service robots: strong mobility, close physical proximity to humans, and fewer repetitive 
operations (METI, 2005).  
The Japanese Robot Association (JARA; http://www.jara.jp) predicts that next generation 
robots (NGRs) will generate up to 7.2 trillion yen (approximately $64.8 billion US) of 
economic activity by 2025, with 4.8 trillion yen going to production and sales and 2.4 trillion 
yen to applications and support (JARA, 2001). The Association divides production and sales 
into three domains: personal living (3.3 trillion yen), medical and social welfare (900 billion 
yen), and public service (500 billion yen). In summary, the NGR industry is currently 
emerging, and we can expect NGRs to enter human living spaces and start serving human 
needs within twenty years, making it imperative that we address safety and control issues 
now. 
3. Robot safety 
3.1 Robot sociability problems  
Since 2000, Japanese and South Korean technocrats have been discussing and preparing for 
a human-robot co-existence society that they believe will emerge by 2030 (COGJ, 2007; 
Lovgren, 2006). Based on the content of policy papers and analyses published by both 
governments, researchers are currently studying potential robot sociability problems (RSP) 
that—unlike technical problems associated with design and manufacturing—entail robot-
related impacts on human interactions in terms of regulations, ethics, and environments. 
Regulators are assuming that within the next two decades, robots will be capable of 
adapting to complex and unstructured environments and interacting with humans to assist 
with daily life tasks. Unlike heavily regulated industrial robots that toil in isolated settings, 
NGRs will have relative autonomy, thus allowing for sophisticated interactions with 
humans. That autonomy raises a number of safety issues that are the focus of this article. 
3.2 NGR safety overview 
In 1981, a 37-year-old factory worker named Kenji Urada entered a restricted safety zone at 
a Kawasaki manufacturing plant to perform some maintenance on a robot. In his haste, he 
failed to completely shut down the unit. The robot’s powerful hydraulic arm pushed the 
engineer into some adjacent machinery, thus making Urada the first recorded victim to die 
at the hands of a robot (“Trust Me,” 2006). This example clearly supports Morita et al.’s 
(1998) observation that when task-performing robots and humans share the same physical 
space, the overriding goal must be to ensure human safety. They note that several safety 
www.intechopen.com
Safety Intelligence and Legal Machine Language: Do We Need the Three Laws of Robotics? 
 
197 
principles have already been adopted for industrial robots—for example, separation of 
operation space, fail-safe design, and emergency stop buttons. However, when NGRs and 
humans share the same physical space, it will be necessary to give robots the capabilities to 
protect biological beings and intelligence to use them. 
Toward that end, METI invited experts from Japan’s service and industrial robotics 
industries, lawyers and legal scholars, and insurance company representatives to participate 
in discussions of NGR safety issues. In July 2007 they published Guidelines to Secure the Safe 
Performance of Next Generation Robots (METI, 2007). According to Yamada (2007), the new 
guidelines are similar to those previously established for industrial robots in terms of risk 
assessment and risk reduction, but also contain five additional principles that make them 
unique to NGR safety requirements: 
• In addition to manufacturers and users, parties who need to be involved in making 
decisions about NGR-related issues include company managers and sellers. In certain 
service domains, pedestrians and patients (in other words, those who will have the 
most contact with NGRs) should be included under the umbrella of NGR risk 
assessment.  
• Accomplishing the goals of risk reduction requires multiple processing and testing 
procedures. 
• Manufacturers need to cooperate with users, sellers, and managers when designing and 
making robots, especially during the risk assessment and reduction stages. 
• Risk assessment procedures, safety strategies, and safety measures need to be clearly 
and thoroughly documented. 
• Managers and sellers are obligated to notify manufacturers about accidents and to 
provide complete records related to those accidents for use in improving robot safety. 
According to the METI guidelines, NGR manufacturers are obligated to enforce risk 
assessment rules and procedures during production. However, Kimura (2007) notes two 
major challenges to service robot risk assessment: their openness makes it difficult to clearly 
define users and task environments, and their novelty makes it hard to predict and calculate 
risk. Here we will add a third challenge: industrial robot safety involves machine standards, 
while autonomous NGR safety involves a mix of machine standards and open texture risk 
resulting from unpredictable interactions in unstructured environments (Weng et al., 2007). 
In a May 2006 paper on legislative issues pertaining to NGR safety, Japanese METI 
committee members described the difference between industrial robots and NGRs in terms 
of pre- and post-human-robot interaction responsibilities (METI, 2006). In the following 
discussion we will refer to them as pre- and post-safety regulations.  
For industrial robots, safety and reliability engineering decisions are guided by a 
combination of pre-safety (with a heavy emphasis on risk assessment) and post-safety 
regulations (focused on responsibility distribution). Pre-safety rules include safeguards 
regarding the use and maintenance of robot systems from the design stage (e.g., hazard 
identification, risk assessment) to the training of robot controllers. As an example of pre-
safety rules, the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive Office (2000) has published a 
set of guidelines for industrial robot safety during the installation, commissioning, testing, 
and programming stages. Another example is International Standardization Organization 
(ISO, 2006a) rules—especially ISO 10218-1:2006, which covers safety-associated design, 
protective measures, and industrial robot applications. In addition to describing basic 
hazards associated with robots, ISO rules are aimed at eliminating or adequately reducing 
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risks associated with identified hazards. ISO 10218-1:2006 spells out safety design guidelines 
(e.g., clearance requirements) that extend ISO rules covering general machine safety to 
industrial robot environments (ISO, 2006b). Those rules thoroughly address safety issues 
related to control systems and software design, but since their primary focus is on robot 
arms and manipulators (ISO, 1994), they have limited application to NGRs. 
3.3 Human based intelligence and open-texture risk  
Neurologists view the human brain as having three layers (primitive, paleopallium, and 
neopallium) that operate like "three interconnected biological computers, [each] with its 
own special intelligence, its own subjectivity, its own sense of time and space, and its own 
memory" (MacLean, 1973). From an AI viewpoint, the biomorphic equivalents of the three 
layers are action intelligence, autonomous intelligence, and human-based intelligence (Fig. 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Robot Intelligence Layers. 
Action intelligence functions are analogous to nervous system responses that coordinate 
sensory and behavioral information, thereby giving robots the ability to control head and 
eye movement (Hager et al., 1995), move spatially (Lewis, 1992), operate machine arms to 
manipulate objects (Chapin et al., 1999), and visually inspect their immediate environments 
(Dickmanns, 1988). Autonomous intelligence refers to capabilities for solving problems 
involving pattern recognition, automated scheduling, and planning based on prior 
experience (Koditschek, 1989). These behaviors are logical and programmable, but not 
conscious.  
The field of robotics is currently in a developmental period that bridges action and 
autonomous intelligence, with robots such as ABIO (http://support.sony-europe.com/ 
abio/), QRIO (Yeomans, 2005), and Roomba (http://www.irobot.com/sp.cfm? 
pageid=122/) on the verge of being lab tested, manufactured, and sold. These simple, small-
scale robots are strong indicators of NGR potential and the coming human-robot co-
existence age. Even as “pioneer” robots, they have remarkable abilities to perform specific 
tasks according to their built-in autonomous intelligence. For example, ABIO and QRIO 
robots have been programmed to serve as companions for the elderly, and Roomba robots 
are capable of performing housecleaning chores. However, none of them can make decisions 
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concerning self-beneficial actions or distinguish between right and wrong based on a sense 
of their own value. 
At the third level is human-based intelligence (HBI)—higher cognitive abilities that allow 
for new ways of looking at one’s environment and for abstract thought; HBI is also referred 
to as “mind” and “real intelligence” (Neisser et al., 1996). Since a universally accepted 
definition of human intelligence has yet to emerge, there is little agreement on a definition 
for robot HBI. Many suggestions and predictions appear to borrow liberally from science 
fiction—for instance, Asimov’s (1976) description of HBI robots forming a new species with 
the long-term potential of gaining power over humans. In real-world contexts, researchers 
are experimenting with ways of combining action, autonomous, and human-based 
intelligence to create robots that “comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly, and learn from 
experience” (Gottfredson, 1997). 
HBI research started in the 1950s—roughly the same time as research on artificial 
intelligence (AI), with which HBI is closely associated. One of the earliest and most famous 
efforts at examining HBI potential entailed what is now known as the “Turing Test” 
(Turing, 1950). Taking a behaviorist approach, Turing defined human intelligence as the 
ability "to respond like a human being," especially regarding the use of natural language to 
communicate. There have been many efforts to create programs that allow robots to respond 
to words and other stimuli in the same manner as humans (“Emotion Robots,” 2007), but no 
AI program has ever passed the Turing test and been accepted as a true example of HBI 
(Saygin et al., 2000). The legal and RSP issues that will arise over the next few decades are 
intricately linked with AI, which was originally conceived as “the science and engineering 
of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent computer programs” (McCarthy, 
2007). 
 
 
Safety Design by Risk 
Assessment 
Safety Intelligence 
Risk Machine Risk 
Autonomous Behavior Risk 
(Open Texture Risk) 
Limit Machine Standards Robot’s Intelligence Architecture 
Effect Decrease Risk Prevent dangerous behaviors 
Table 1. A Comparison of Safety Regulation Methods. 
Designed and constructed according to very specific standards, industrial robots are limited 
to performing tasks that can be reduced to their corresponding mechanisms—in other 
words, they cannot alter their mechanisms to meet the needs of changing environments. 
Therefore, the primary purpose for performing industrial robot risk assessments is to design 
mechanisms that match pre-approved safety levels (Table 1).  
Complex NGR motions, multi-object interactions, and responses to shifts in environments 
resulting from complex interactions with humans cannot be reduced to simple performance 
parameters. Furthermore, residual risk will increase as robot intelligence evolves from 
action to autonomous to human-based, implying that current assessment methods will 
eventually lose their value. Instead, NGR designers/manufacturers and HBI developers will 
have to deal with unpredictable hazards associated with the legal concepts of core meaning 
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and open texture risk. While all terms in a natural language have core meanings, the open 
texture characteristic of human language allows for interpretations that vary according to 
specific domains, points of view, time periods, and other factors—all of which can trigger 
uncertainty and vagueness in legal interpretations (Lyons, 1999). In addition to clearly 
defining core meanings, autonomous NGR designers and programmers must predict their 
acceptable and useful ranges.  
In a policy paper published in May of 2007, the Japanese METI predicted that the addition of 
NGRs into human society will occur in three stages (METI, 2007). The focus of the first 
(current) stage is on “the diffusion of specific working object robots” to perform tasks such 
as cleaning, security, carrying documents or objects, and performing desk clerk duties. The 
second (expected to begin between now and 2010) will consist of “specific user and 
autonomously working object robots”—for example, nurse robots that can perform tasks to 
support the elderly. The final stage (beginning between 2010 and 2015) will primarily 
consist of multi-task autonomous (“universal”) robots. METI describes the first stage as a 
“point” diffusion (meaning a low degree of human contact), the second as a “line” diffusion 
(medium degree), and the third as a “facet” diffusion (high degree). The extent to which 
each stage affects the daily lives of humans depends on the speed and content of AI 
development. Regardless of the specific characteristics of human-NGR interaction within 
each stage, open-texture risk will expand significantly with each transition. The inherent 
unpredictability of unstructured environments makes it virtually impossible that humans 
will ever create a fail-safe mechanism that allows autonomous robots to solve all open-
texture problems.  
4. Safety intelligence 
4.1 Safety intelligence (SI) and Asimov’s Three Laws. 
NGR safety regulations will require a mix of pre- and post-safety mechanisms, the first 
entailing programming and using a robot’s AI content to eliminate risk, and the second a 
product liability system to deal with accidents that do occur. A clear security issue will be 
limiting NGR “self-control” while still allowing them to perform designated tasks. As one 
Roboethics Roadmap author succinctly states, “Operators should be able to limit robot 
autonomy when the correct robot behavior is not guaranteed” (EURON, 2006).  
Giving operators this capability requires what we will call safety intelligence (SI), a system of 
artificial intelligence restrictions whose sole purpose is to provide safety parameters when 
semi-autonomous robots perform tasks. Researchers have yet to agree on a foundation for a 
SI system, but the most frequently mentioned is Isaac Asimov’s (1950) “Three Laws of 
Robotics,” created for his science fiction novel, I, Robot: 
• First Law: A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm. 
• Second Law: A robot must obey orders given it by human beings, except when such 
orders conflict with the First Law. 
• Third Law: A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not 
conflict with the First or Second Law. 
The first two laws represent a human-centered approach to SI that agrees with the current 
consensus of NGR designers and producers. As robots gradually take on greater numbers of 
labor-intensive and repetitive jobs outside of factories and workplaces, it will become 
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increasingly important for laws and regulations to support SI as a “mechanism of human 
superiority” (Fodor, 1987). The third law straddles the line between human- and machine-
centered approaches. Since the purpose of their functionality is to satisfy human needs, 
robots must be designed and built so as to protect themselves as human property, in 
contrast to biological organisms that protect themselves for their own existence. As one 
magazine columnist has jokingly suggested, “A robot will guard its own existence … 
because a robot is bloody expensive” (Langford, 2006). 
In his introduction to The Rest of the Robots (1964), Asimov wrote, “There was just enough 
ambiguity in the Three Laws to provide the conflicts and uncertainties required for new 
stories, and, to my great relief, it seemed always to be possible to think up a new angle out 
of the 61 words of the Three Laws.” While those ambiguities may be wonderful for writing 
fiction, they stand as significant roadblocks to establishing workable safety standards for 
complex NGRs. Roboethics Roadmap authors note that the Three Laws raise many questions 
about NGR programming: Which kinds of ethics are correct and who decides? Will 
roboethics really represent the characteristics of robots or the values of robot scientists? How 
far can and should we go when we program ethics into robots? (EURON, 2006) 
Other robot researchers argue that Asimov's laws still belong to the realm of science fiction 
because they are not yet applicable. Hiroshi Ishiguru of Osaka University, the co-creator of 
two female androids named Repliee Q1 and Repliee Q2 (Whitehouse, 2005), believes it 
would be a mistake to accept Asimov's laws as the primary guiding principle for 
establishing robot ethics: “If we have a more intelligent vehicle [i.e., automobile], who takes 
responsibility when it has an accident? We can ask the same question of a robot. Robots do 
not have human-level intelligence” (Lovgren, 2007). Mark Tilden, the designer of a toy-like 
robot named RoboSapien, says “the problem is that giving robots morals is like teaching an 
ant to yodel. We're not there yet, and as many of Asimov's stories show, the conundrums 
robots and humans would face would result in more tragedy than utility" (ibid.). Ian Kerr 
(2007), law professor at the University of Ottawa, concurs that a code of ethics for robots is 
unnecessary:  
Leaving aside the thorny philosophical question of whether an AI could ever become a 
moral agent, it should be relatively obvious from their articulation that Asimov's laws 
are not ethical or legal guidelines for robots but rather about them. The laws are meant 
to constrain the people who build robots from exponentially increasing intelligence so 
that the machines remain destined to lives of friendly servitude. The pecking order is 
clear: robots serve people.  
4.2 Three problems tied to Asimov’s laws  
Currently there are two competing perspectives on dealing with the mix of AI and safety: 
creating artificial agents with safety-oriented reasoning capabilities, or programming robots 
with as many rules as required for ensuring the highest level of safe behavior. Which 
perspective wins out will depend on how policy makers, designers, and manufacturers 
address three issues that we will address in the following subsections. 
4.2.1 Legalities: safety intelligence 
Future robot-related planning and design decisions will involve human values and social 
control, and addressing them will require input from legal scholars, social scientists, and 
public policy makers. A great amount of the data they will use to support their decisions 
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must come from researchers familiar with robot legal studies. Levy (2006) argues 
convincingly that a new legal branch of robot law is required to deal with a technology that 
by the end of this century will be found in the majority of the world’s households. Robot 
safety will be a major component of robot law. From an engineering viewpoint, SI entails 
self-control; from a legal viewpoint, SI entails automatic compliance and obedience to 
human rules. The need to add individual restrictions to autonomous robot behavior will be 
limited to those problems that pre-safety risk assessments cannot successfully address in 
order to meet two major goals of robot law: restricting human behaviors to prevent the 
misuse of robots, and restricting autonomous robot behaviors to mitigate open texture risk. 
Most likely a combination of these restrictions and carefully crafted legislation to let robots 
enforce the legal norm will be required to achieve a maximum state of robot safety. 
As noted earlier, it is unrealistic to assume that SI will ever be able to eliminate all risk; 
instead, it is better to view SI as one part of a regulatory system that also contains a strong 
technological component. We believe the respective roles of designers, users, creators, and 
robots must be spelled out before the human-robot co-existence society emerges, while 
acknowledging that liability questions will require many court decisions to refine. For 
example, if Asimov’s laws are used as a guideline, how will we enforce the idea that robots 
must not allow human beings to come to harm through inaction? Further, what about 
situations in which a NGR follows an incorrect human command? 
4.2.2 Decision-making: do NGRs need doctrinal reasoning?  
Giving autonomous robots the ability to define their own safety concepts means giving 
them the power to decide both when and how to react to stimuli. At some point such 
decisions will require artificial ethical and morality reasoning—the ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong. Robotists such as Shigeo Hirose (1989) argue that in conflicts 
involving doctrinal reasoning and morality, Asimov’s Three Laws may become 
contradictory or be set aside in favor of poorly chosen human priorities. Using an extreme 
example, robots could be programmed to commit homicide under specific circumstances 
based on the wishes of a human majority. This example touches on two fears that many 
people have when they consider autonomous robots: they are troubled by the idea of letting 
robots obey rules that are difficult or impossible to express legislatively, and fearful of 
letting them defend laws established by imperfect humans. 
The robot decision-making problem requires debate on both morality reasoning and legal 
content. Asimov himself acknowledged the potential for multiple contradictions between 
his Three Laws and doctrinal reasoning—many of them based on natural language, the 
medium used by humans to access legal content. Despite the many problems that human 
legal language present regarding vagueness and abstraction, laws and rules have the quality 
of being understood and followed via doctrinal reasoning. To argue that the same process 
can be used to accomplish SI means finding a universally accepted answer to the question, 
“Do NGRs need doctrinal reasoning to accomplish SI, and is it possible for them to acquire 
it?” 
The focus of the new field of human-robot interaction (HRI) is communication and 
collaboration between people and robots. HRI researchers view human-robot 
communication as having verbal (using natural language) and non-verbal components (e.g., 
actions, gestures, non-linguistic sounds, and environment). Humans communicate using a 
mix of verbal and non-verbal information, with non-verbal information representing up to 
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60-70% of total communication (Kurogawa, 1994). We believe that non-verbal 
communication is a more reliable means for implementing SI and avoiding contradictions 
tied to doctrinal reasoning. The issue is necessarily complex because it entails AI, control 
engineering, human values, social control, and the processes by which laws are formed. In 
addition to being beyond the scope of this chapter, SI decisions are beyond the range of 
robotists’ training and talent, meaning that they must work hand-in-hand with legal 
scholars.  
4.2.3 Abstract thinking and the meaning of “safety” 
The ability to think abstractly is uniquely human, and there is no way of being absolutely 
certain of how robots will interpret and react to abstract meanings and vague terms 
common to human communication. For example, humans know how to distinguish 
between blood resulting from a surgical operation and blood resulting from acts of violence. 
Making that distinction requires the ability to converse, to understand abstract expressions 
(especially metaphors), and to use domain knowledge to correctly interpret the meaning of a 
sentence. There are many examples that illustrate just how difficult this task is: Chomsky’s 
(1957) famous sentence showing the inadequacy of logical grammar (“Colorless green ideas 
sleep furiously”), and Groucho Marx’s line, “Time flies like an arrow, fruit flies like a 
banana” (http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/26.html). Such examples may explain 
why Asimov (1957) described robots as "logical but not reasonable." 
If one day robots are given the power to think abstractly, then humans will have to deal 
with yet another legal problem: robo-rights. In 2006, the Horizon Scanning Centre (part of 
the United Kingdom’s Office of Science and Innovation) published a white paper with 
predictions for scientific, technological, and health trends for the middle of this century 
(“Robots Could,” 2006). The authors of the section entitled “Utopian Dream, or Rise of the 
Machines” raise the possibility of robots evolving to the degree that they eventually ask for 
special “robo-rights” (see also “Robot Rights?” 2006). In this paper we will limit our 
discussion to how current human legal systems (in which rights are closely tied to 
responsibilities) will be used when dealing with questions tied to early generations of non-
industrial robots.  
Whenever an accident involving humans occurs, the person or organization responsible for 
paying damages can range from individuals (for reasons of user error) to product 
manufacturers (for reasons of poor product design or quality). Rights and responsibilities 
will need to be spelled out for two types of NGRs. The system for the first type—NGRs 
lacking AI-based “self-awareness”—will be straightforward: 100% human-centered, in the 
same manner that dog owners must take responsibility for the actions of their pets. In other 
words, robots in this category will never be given human-like rights or rights as legal 
entities.  
The second type consists of NGRs programmed with some degree of “self-awareness,” and 
therefore capable of making autonomous decisions that can result in damage to persons or 
property. Nagenborg et al. (2007) argue that all robot responsibilities are actually human 
responsibilities, and that today’s product developers and sellers must acknowledge this 
principle when designing first-generation robots for public consumption. They use two 
codes of ethics (one from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the other 
from the Association of Computing Machinery) to support their view that for complex 
machines such as robots, any attempt to remove product responsibility from developers, 
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manufacturers, and users represents a serious break from human legal systems. We may see 
a day when certain classes of robots will be manufactured with built-in and retrievable 
“black boxes” to assist with the task of attributing fault when accidents occur, since in 
practice it will be difficult to attribute responsibility for damages caused by robots—
especially those resulting from owner misuse. For this reason, Nagenborg et al. have 
proposed the following meta-regulation:  
If anybody or anything should suffer from damage that is caused by a robot that is 
capable of learning, there must be a demand that the burden of adducing evidence must 
be with the robot’s keeper, who must prove her or his innocence; for example, 
somebody may be considered innocent who acted according to the producer’s 
operation instructions. In this case it is the producer who needs to be held responsible 
for the damage. 
If responsibility for robot actions ever reaches the point of being denied by humans, a major 
issue for legal systems will be determining punishment. In wondering whether human 
punishment can ever be applied to robots, Peter Asaro (2007) observes that : 
They do have bodies to kick, though it is not clear that kicking them would achieve the 
traditional goals of punishment. The various forms of corporal punishment presuppose 
additional desires and fears of being human that may not readily apply to robots—pain, 
freedom of movement, morality, etc. Thus, torture, imprisonment and destruction are 
not likely to be effective in achieving justice, reform and deterrence in robots. There 
may be a policy to destroy any robots that do harm, but as is the case with animals that 
harm people, it would be a preventative measure to avoid future harms rather than a 
true punishment. ... [American law] offers several ways of thinking about the 
distribution of responsibility in complex cases. Responsibility for a single event can be 
divided among several parties, with each party assigned a percentage of the total.  
If we go this route, we may need to spell out robo-rights and responsibilities in the same 
manner that we do for such non-human entities as corporations; this is a core value in 
human legal systems. The question is whether or not we will be able to apply human-
centered values to robots in the same manner. To practice “robot justice,” those systems will 
be required to have separate sets of laws reflecting dual human/robot-centered values, and 
robot responsibilities would need to be clearly spelled out.  
4.3 Three criteria and two critical issues for SI 
As we have shown so far, Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics face several significant legal and 
engineering challenges, especially the need for collaboration among designers, AI 
programmers, and legal scholars to address robot sociability problems with safety as the 
guiding principle. Based on our belief that the importance of SI will increase as we rapidly 
approach a period in which NGRs are developed, tested, built, and sold on a large scale, we 
are currently working on a safety regulation model that emphasizes the role of SI during the 
pre-safety stage. In its current form, our proposal rests on three criteria for safe human-NGR 
interaction: (a) the ongoing capability to assess changing situations accurately and to 
correctly respond to complex real-world conditions; (b) immediate protective reactions in 
human-predictable ways so as to mitigate risks tied to language-based misunderstandings 
or unstable autonomous behaviors; and (c) an explicit interaction rule set and legal 
architecture that can be applied to all NGRs, one that accommodates the needs of a human-
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robot co-existence society in terms of simplicity and accountability. In order to apply the 
three criteria, there is a need to break down the safety intelligence concept into the two 
dimensions that are the focus of the next two sections. The first, which is ethics-centered, 
involves a special “third existence” status for robots or a complete ban on equipping NGRs 
with human based intelligence. The second involves the integration of third existence 
designation with a legal machine language designed to resolve issues associated with open 
texture risk.  
5. Future considerations 
In “ROBOT: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind” (1999), Carnegie Mellon professor Hans 
Moravec predicts that robot intelligence will “evolve” from lizard-level in 2010, to mouse-
level in 2020, to monkey level in 2030, and finally to human level in 2040—in other words, 
some robots will strongly resemble first-existence (biological) entities by mid-century. If his 
prediction is correct, determining the form and content of these emerging robots will require 
broad consensus on ethical issues in the same manner as nuclear physics, nanotechnology, 
and bioengineering. Creating consensus on these issues may require a model similar to that 
of the Human Genome Project for the study of Ethical, Legal and Social Issues (ELSI) 
sponsored by the US Department of Energy and National Institutes of Health 
(http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/research/elsi.shtml). Each 
agency has earmarked 3-5 percent of all financial support for genome research for 
addressing ethical issues. ELSI’s counterpart across the Atlantic is the European Robotics 
Research Network (EURON), a private organization devoted to creating resources for and 
exchanging knowledge about robotics research (http://www.euron.org/). As part of its 
effort to create a systematic assessment procedure for ethical issues involving robotics 
research and development, EURON has published Roboethics Roadmap (2006), a collection of 
articles outlining potential research pathways and speculating on how each one might 
develop.  
According to the Roadmap authors, most members of the robotics community express one of 
three attitudes toward the issue of roboethics: 
• Not interested. They regard robotics as a technical field and don’t believe they have a 
social or moral responsibility to monitor their work. 
• Interested in short-term ethical questions. They acknowledge the possibility of “good” 
or “bad” robotics and respect the thinking behind implementing laws and considering 
the needs of special populations such as the elderly. 
• Interested in long-term ethical concerns. They express concern for such issues as 
“digital divides” between world regions or age groups. These individuals are aware of 
the technology gap between industrialized and poor countries and the utility of 
developing robots for both types.  
We (the authors of this paper) belong to the third category, believing that social and/or 
moral questions are bound to accompany the emergence of a human-robot co-existence 
society, and that such a society will emerge sooner than most people realize. Furthermore, 
we agree with the suggestions of several Roboethics Roadmap authors that resolving these 
ethical issues will require agreement in six areas:  
• Are Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics usable as a guideline for establishing a code of 
roboethics? 
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• Should roboethics represent the ethics of robots or of robot scientists? 
• How far can we go in terms of embodying ethics in robots?  
• How contradictory are the goals of implementing roboethics and developing highly 
autonomous robots? 
• Should we allow robots to exhibit “personalities”? 
• Should we allow robots to express “emotions”? 
This list does not include the obvious issue of what kinds of ethics are correct for robots. 
Regarding “artificial” (i.e., programmable) ethics, some Roadmap authors briefly touch on 
needs and possibilities associated with robot moral values and decisions, but generally shy 
away from major ethical questions. We consider this unfortunate, since the connection 
between artificial and human-centered ethics is so close as to make them very difficult to 
separate. The ambiguity of the term artificial ethics as used in the EURON report ignores two 
major concerns: how to program robots to obey a set of legal and ethical norms while 
retaining a high degree of autonomy (Type 1), and how to control robot-generated value 
systems or morality (Type 2). Since both will be created and installed by humans, 
boundaries between them will be exceptionally fluid.  
5.1 “Learning” ethics 
Two primary research categories in the field of artificial intelligence are conventional (or 
symbolic) and computational. Conventional AI, which entails rational logical reasoning based 
on a system of symbols representing human knowledge in a declarative form (Newell & 
Simon, 1995), has been used for such applications as chess games employing reasoning 
powers (Hsu et al., 1995), conversation programs using text mining procedures 
(http://www.alicebot.org), and expert systems that are used to organize domain-specific 
knowledge (Lederberg, 1987). While conventional AI is capable of limited reasoning, 
planning, and abstract thinking powers, researchers generally agree that the use of symbols 
does not represent “mindful” comprehension and is therefore extremely limited in terms of 
learning from experience (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980).  
Computational (non-symbol) AI (Engelbrecht, 2002) mimics natural learning methods such 
as genetic (Mitchell, 1996) or neural (Abdi, 1994). It supports learning and adaptation based 
on environmental information in the absence of explicit rules—an important first existence 
capability. Some advantages of computational AI are its capacities for overcoming noise 
problems, working with systems that are difficult to reduce to logical rules, and performing 
such tasks as robot arm control, walking on non-smooth surfaces, and pattern recognition. 
However, as proven by chess programs, computational AI is significantly weaker than 
conventional AI in abstract thinking and rule compliance. Still, many robotics and AI 
researchers believe that HBI in robots is inevitable following breakthroughs in 
computational AI (Warwick, 2004), while others argue that computational and conventional 
AI are both examples of behaviorism, and therefore will never capture the essence of HBI 
(Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Penrose, 1989). Those in the latter group claim that reaching such 
a goal will require a completely new framework for understanding intelligence (Hawkins & 
Blakeslee, 2006). 
We believe the odds favor the eventual emergence of HBI robots, and therefore researchers 
must take them into consideration when predicting future robot safety and legal issues. 
They may agree with Shigeo Hirose of the Tokyo Institute of Technology that a prohibition 
on HBI is necessary (quoted in Tajika, 2001). Hirose is one of a growing number of 
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researchers and robot designers resisting what is known as the “humanoid complex” trend, 
based on his strict adherence to the original goal of robotics: inventing useful tools for 
human use (quoted in Kamoshita, 2005). For Alan Mackworth, past president of the 
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, the HBI issue is one of “should or 
shouldn’t we” as opposed to “can or can’t we” (“What’s a Robot?” 2007). Arguing that goal-
oriented robots do not require what humans refer to as “awareness,” Mackworth challenges 
the idea that we need to create HBI for machines.  
5.2 Third existence 
In an earlier section we discussed the idea that robot responsibility should be regarded as 
human-owner responsibility. If we allow HBI robots to be manufactured and sold, the 
potential for any degree of robot self-awareness means dealing with issues such as 
punishment and a shift from human-centered to human-robot dual values. This is one of the 
most important reasons why we support a ban on installing HBI software in robots—
perhaps permanently, but certainly until policy makers and robotists arrive at a generally 
accepted agreement on these issues. We also believe that creating Type 1 robots—in other 
words, programming robots to obey a set of legal and ethical norms while retaining a high 
degree of autonomy—requires agreement on human-centered ethics based on human 
values. The challenge is determining how to integrate human legal norms into robots so that 
they become central to robot behavior. The most worrisome issue is the potential of late-
generation HBI robots with greater degrees of self-awareness to generate their own values 
and ethics—what we call Type 2 artificial ethics. Implementing Type 2 robot safety 
standards means addressing the uncertainties of machines capable of acting outside of 
human norms. We are nowhere near discussing—let alone implementing—policies for 
controlling HBI robot behavior, since we are very far from having HBI robots as part of our 
daily lives.  
However, if the AI-HBI optimists are correct, the risks associated with HBI robots will 
necessitate very specific guidelines. A guiding principle for those guidelines may be the 
categorization of robots as “third existence,” a concept created by Waseda University’s Shuji 
Hashimoto (2003). Instead of living/biological (first existence) or non-living/non-biological 
(second existence), he describes third existence entities as machines that resemble living 
beings in appearance and behavior. We think this definition overlooks an important human-
robot co-existence premise: most NGRs will be restricted to levels of autonomous 
intelligence that fall far short of HBI, therefore their similarities with humans will be minor. 
In addition, the current legal system emphasizes the status of robots as second-existence 
human property, which may be inadequate for those semi-autonomous NGRs that are about 
to make their appearance in people’s homes and businesses, especially in terms of 
responsibility distribution in the case of accidents. In their analyses, Asaro (2007) suggests 
the creation of a new legal status for robots as “quasi persons” or “corporations,” while 
Nugenborg (2007) emphasizes the point we made earlier about how robot owners must be 
held responsible for their robots’ actions in the same way as pet owners. 
6. Legal machine language 
We believe there are two plausible strategies for integrating NGR safety intelligence with 
legal systems, one that uses natural languages and one that uses artificial machine 
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languages. We will respectively refer to these as legal natural language (LNL) and legal 
machine language (LML) (Weng, et al., unpublished manuscript). The main goal of an LNL 
approach is to create machines capable of understanding ranges of commands and making 
intelligent decisions according to laws and rules written in a natural language. Since LNL is 
the primary medium for accessing legal content in human society, using it to program 
robots eliminates the need for an alternative medium, which is considered a difficult task 
requiring a combination of HBI and solutions to the structured-vs.-open texture issues 
discussed earlier. For the foreseeable future, NGRs will not be capable of making 
autonomous decisions based on a combination of legal natural language and an underlying 
principle such as Asimov’s Three Laws. 
Constructed languages (e.g., programming languages and code) can be used as bases for 
legal machine languages (LMLs) that express legal content. Two common examples already 
in use are bots (also called agent software) and service programs employed in agency network 
environments for providing content, managing resources, and probing for information. It is 
possible to use LML to control robot behavior—in Lawrence Lessig’s (1999) words, “We can 
build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are fundamental.” 
We will give three examples of how LMLs are currently being used. First, the Internet 
Content Rating Association (ICRA) (http://www.fosi.org/icra) has created a standard 
content description system that combines features of a Resource Description Framework 
(RDF) and a Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS). The system permits the marking 
of website content according to categories such as nudity, sex, or violence, and then allows 
parents and teachers to control online access. RDF makes it possible for machines to 
understand and react to ICRA labels embedded in websites as meta-tags. Whenever a 
browser with a built-in content filter (e.g., Microsoft Explorer’s “Content Advisor”) reads 
ICRA label data, it has the power to disobey user instructions based on “legal standards” 
established by parents or other authority. The second example is Robot Exclusion Standards 
(RES) (http://www.robotstxt.org/orig.html), also known as Robots Exclusion Protocol or 
robots.txt protocol. RES is currently being used to prevent web bots (“spiders”) from 
accessing web pages that owners want to keep private, with the privacy policy written in a 
script or programming language. The third is Creative Commons (CC) (http:// 
creativecommons.org/licenses/), used by copyright holders who want to control access in 
terms of sharing written information that they place on web sites. In addition to open 
content licensing, CC offers a RDF/XML metadata scheme that is readable by web bots. 
These examples show how humans can use constructed languages to communicate with 
robots in highly autonomous environments and to control their behavior according to 
agreed-upon legal standards.  
Constructed languages are being examined as a means of overcoming the problem of 
ambiguity and the need to understand a range of commands associated with natural 
languages. Perhaps the best-known example is Loglan (http://www.loglan.org), identified 
as potentially suitable for human-computer communication due to its use of predicate logic, 
avoidance of syntactical ambiguity, and conciseness. The constructed language approach to 
programming commands in robots can be viewed as an intermediate step between human 
commands and autonomous robot behavior. As we stated above, NGRs in the foreseeable 
future will not be capable of making autonomous decisions based on a combination of legal 
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natural language and an underlying principle such as Asimov’s Three Laws. Since legal 
machine language does not give robots direct access to legal content, machines can be 
programmed to behave according to legal constraints without the addition of artificial 
ethics. Most likely a mix of LNL and LML will be required as NGRs interact more with 
humans, with human-machine communication based on simple rule sets designed to 
enhance safety when robots work around humans. 
In an earlier section we discussed the neo-mammalian brain (HBI equivalent) functions of 
processing ethics, performing morality reasoning, and making right/wrong decisions. 
However, such a high level of reasoning is not required to recognize situations, avoid 
misunderstandings, and prevent accidents; a combination of action intelligence 
(unconscious) and autonomous intelligence (subconscious) is sufficient for these purposes. 
Nature gives us many examples of animals interacting safely without complex moral 
judgments or natural languages. When birds of the same species migrate, their shared 
genetic background allows them to fly in close or v-shaped formations without colliding—
an important feature for collective and individual survival. This kind of safe interaction 
requires adherence to a set of simple non-verbal rules: avoid crowding neighboring birds, 
fly along the same heading, or at least along the same average heading as neighboring birds 
(Klein et al., 2003). The same flocking concept observed in birds, schools of fish, and swarms 
of insects is used to control unmanned aircraft and other machines (Gabbai, 2005; Reynolds, 
1987). HBI-level moral and ethical decisions still require autonomous and action intelligence 
to correctly recognize environmental and situational factors prior to reacting in a safe 
manner.  
6.1 Reflex control 
Currently the focus of some exciting research, reflex control holds major potential as a tool 
allowing for the use of non-verbal communication and LML to command and control NGRs. 
Reflex control is a biomorphic concept based on the behaviorist principles of stimulus and 
response and the evolutionary principles of cross-generation inheritance. The basic function 
of reflexes, which are genetically built-in and learned by humans and animals, is to trigger 
protective behaviors within and across species, as well as between a species and its 
environment. Today we have a much clearer understanding of reflex action (and how it 
might be used to control robot behavior) than we do of complex intelligence. Some 
researchers are experimenting with sensors linked to reflexive controls—a combination 
known as “experiential expert systems” (Bekey & Tomovic, 1986)—for motion control 
(Zhang et al., 2002), automatic obstacle avoidance (Newman, 1989), collision avoidance 
(Wikman et al., 1993), and other simple behaviors associated with autonomous and action 
intelligence. Instead of requiring complex reasoning or learning capacities, robots equipped 
with reflex action can navigate fairly complex environments according to simple sets of 
common rules. Other robotists are working on a combination of reflex control and the ability 
to learn new protective behaviors for biomorphic robots, perhaps with a mechanism for 
transferring new knowledge to other machines. From a SI standpoint, reflex control allows 
for a high degree of safety in robot behavior because reactions can be limited to direct and 
immediate danger and programmed according to explicitly mapped responses. This meets 
our criteria for SI as a fast, clear, non-verbal, and predictable approach. Different sets of 
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simple rules may be developed for NGRs operating in different environments (or countries) 
while still adhering to a “safety gene” standard (an explicit legal architecture applicable to 
all kinds of NGR robots), thereby satisfying another SI criteria. 
An important distinction between human-designed robot reflex control and a NGR safety 
intelligence unit is that the SI unit would include content based on societal requirements to 
address open texture risk. Again, such content will require input from specialists to ensure 
compliance with accepted legal principles. If robotists ever reach a level of technological 
expertise that allows for HBI-programmed machines, a decision will have to be made about 
whether or not robots should be given human capabilities, or if reflex actions are sufficient 
for the needs and purposes of a human-robot co-existence society. 
7. Conclusion 
By the middle of this century, artificial intelligence and robot technology will no longer be 
considered science fiction fantasy. At the same time that engineers will be addressing all 
kinds of technical issues, a combination of engineers, social scientists, legal scholars, and 
policy makers will be making important decisions regarding robot sociability. In all cases, 
the topmost concern must be robot safety, since the emphasis for the future will be on 
human-robot co-existence.  
In this paper we described a safety intelligence concept that meets three criteria: 
understanding situations, making decisions, and taking responsibility. The SI concept can 
also be broken down into two dimensions, the first involving special “third existence” 
ethical guidelines for robots plus a ban on equipping NGRs with human-based intelligence, 
and the second involving a mix of third existence designation and legal machine language 
designed to resolve issues associated with open texture risk. If current reflex control 
research proves successful, robots will someday be equipped with a safety reflex system to 
ensure that they avoid dangerous situations, especially those involving humans. 
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